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The core of Shapley-Shubik games and general equilibrium models with a Venn diagram is
applied for a theory on the role of real nance in economic growth among advanced economies.
Then the dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) models for Germany, France, UK,
Japan and USA are constructed to assess the validity of the over nancing hypothesis that
reappeared after the nancial crisis of 2008. Actual nancial deepening ratios observed in the
non-consolidated balancesheet of the OECD exceeded by factors of 3.5, 2.4, 5.1, 11.6 and 4.8 to
the optimal nancial deepening ratios implied by DCGE models respectively in these countries
because of excessive leveraging and bubbles up to 19 times of GDP which were responsible
for this great recession. Containing such massive uctuations for macroeconomic stability and
growth in these economies is not possible in conventional scal and monetary policy models
and requires a DCGE analysis like this along with adoption of separating equilibria strategy in
line of Miller-Stiglitz-Roth mechanisms to avoid asymmetric information problems in process of
nancial intermediation so that the gap between actual and optimal ratios of nancial deepening
remain as small as possible.
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1 An Introduction to Finance and Economic Growth
A good nancial system channels savings into investment, allows intertemporal optimisation by
individuals and rms, spreads risk among people and is a factor for an e¢ cient dynamic economy.
It causes economic crises when it is out of control as in 2008/09 that originated from distorted
nancial incentives. Reversing of housing market bubbles and the credit crises in the US spread
around the globe. Recessions that it caused hit hard to the US, UK, EU, Japan and many other
advanced countries and slowed down growths and other economic activities in them. Output,
employment, investment, capital accumulation, exports and imports shrank causing alarming losses
of income, deterioration in living standards of households and loss of business or prot prospects
of small, medium and large scale rms. Governments of these countries attempted to stimulate
the aggregate demand by expanding the public expenditure and cutting down the taxes despite
growing risk of accumulation of public debts. Central banks reduced the basic interest rate to a
record low rate since the beginning of central banking in order to expand the liquidity is the system;
since January 2009 Federal fund rate has remained close to zero, Bank of Englands basic rate is
0.5 percent and ECBs basic rate is now at 0.1 percent. Sources of credit levels of banks expanded
under the quantitative easing. Why does a nancial system collapse like this and how do they a¤ect
on long run growth are questions of great interest.
Five major theories have been advanced to explain the role of nancial sector in the economy
in the literature. The rst theory has its origin in the classical school of competitive and e¢ cient
markets. The fact that the process of capital accumulation and growth in modern economies is
enhanced substantially by the nancial markets that channel resources of millions of risk adverse
savers to millions of risk neutral borrowers is well recognised for long. Schumpeter (1911) argued for
nancial development for economic growth but Robinson (1952) viewed the nancial development as
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a by-product of economic growth process. Importance of risk minimisation and e¢ ciency of portfolio
allocation was noted by Markowitz (1959) and Merton (1973). Then Sidrauski (1967) and Tobin
(1969) linked the balance sheet of the nancial system to economic growth. The process of nancial
deepening and banking rms were discussed in Klein (1971) and Shaw (1973). These concepts were
applied to developing economies by McKinnon (1973) and Fry (1978). King and Levine (1993) and
Levin (1997) tested these propositions empirically across countries. Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale
(2010) and Davies et al. (2010) studied recently the links of recessions to evolution of banking
system in the context of the UK economy.
The second wave of literature in the nancial deepening and growth emphasises the role of
strategic modelling with Nash bargaining and signalling problems and coalition formation in line
of Shapley (1953) and Shapley and Shubik (1969) and mechanism design of Rogerson (1985) and
Roth (2008). Rasmusen (1987), Beaudry and Poitevin (1995), Cripps (1997), Dasgupta and Maskin
(2000) and Roth (2008) further advanced strategic choices relating to investment. While the analysis
of consequences of bank-runs are found in Diamond, Douglas and Dybvig (1983)), informal nance,
stochastic factors and the nancial structure and growth of economies are discussed in Townsend
(1983), Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Bolnick(1987). Consequences of transaction cost in bilateral
and multilateral negotiations (Balasko (2003), Kiyotaki and Moore (2006)) and nancial deepening
(Townsend and Ueda (2006)) were considered for developing models of coalition of intermediaries.
Neoclassical and neo-Keynesian modeling paradigm of King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) and
Covas and Den Haan (2012) have rened linking of nancial sector to economic growth. Finanical
markets should be thick, less congested and safe for its participants as should the Kidney exchange
centres be for the potential donors and receivers of Kidneys (Roth (2008)).
Third set of literature on nance and growth focuses on risk management and highlights the
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importance of the liquidity of the banking sector in theoretical or empirical settings in spirit of
Epstein and Zin (1989), Fama (1980, 2014), Spencer(1984, 2008), Bank of England (1999), Raghu-
ram and Zingales (1998), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Radelet, Sachs, Cooper and Bosworth
(1998), Cecchetti (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Mendoza (2010) and Gai, Kapadia, Millard and
Perez (2008). Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Carlin and Mayer (2003) and Allena, Vayanos and
Vives (2014) survey the literature relating to the liberalisation of nancial sector and associated
problems including those of saving and loan associations in 1980 in the US, bank runs and failures
of giant banks in Japan in 1990s or the collapse of credit and housing markets in the US and several
EU economies recently including the credit crunch, bank failures, liquidity crises, stock market crash
and bailouts in UK, EU and US after the crisis in October, 2008. Excellent intuition in these are
found in Fama (2014) and Shiller (2014·). New techniques on decomposing the impacts of shocks in
the macroeconomy are developed further in Hansen (2012) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
Fourthly the endogeniety and simultaneity between nancial structure and economic growth is
explained with general equilibrium and endogenous economic growth models by Greenwood, and
Javanovic (1990), Robinson (1991), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Mercenier and Srinivasan
ed. (1994), Altig, Carlstrom and Lansing (1995), Bhattarai (1997) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti
(1997). Recent resurgence of interest in analysing more complex nature of nancial deepening and
economics growth in international scale, particularly after the nancial crises of 2008, is seen in
Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013), Farmer (2013), Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) and Pilbeam and
Olmo and Pouliot (2011).
Finally above propositions have been brought to empirical scrutiny as the data series on interest
rates, deposits, stocks, bonds, foreign currency reserves and their prices becoming increasingly
available in recent years (see Taylor (2010)). Propositions of King and Levine (1993) and Levin
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(1997) have been tested for many economies in recent years (Allena, Vayanos and Vives (2014),
Carlin and Mayer (2003), Arestis, Demitriades and Luintel (2001), Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000)).
Various studies exist on the evaluation of impacts of nancial sector in the economy (Bank of
England (1999), Brunnermeier (2009) and Cecchetti (2009)). How the asymmetry of information
on depositors and savers results in volatilities of unimaginable proportions in these markets and how
it a¤ects the choices of economic agents and prospects of economies is analysed testing theoretical
models with empirical evidences. Financial markets often experience catastrophic failures whenever
the expectations of lenders and borrowers do not match market realities.
Using four indicators of nancial development for about 119 countries for 1960 to 1989 King
and Levin (1993) had showed panel data analysis based empirical support for the Schumpeterian
hypothesis that nancial development leads to economic growth in contrast to the Robinsonian
argument that growth rate of output had little connections to the nancial development. The
long run growth is a function of real physical capital not the nancial leverages or derivatives
that promotes the articial nancial deepening. Over-nancing however is a phenomenon that has
become more serious in the last two decades. The results from the DCGE computations reveals that
there are little di¤erences on the optimal nancial deepening ratios across countries but there are
large di¤erences in actual nancial ratios. Such gaps between these two measures are due to casino
capitalism (Sinn (2010)) and asset bubbles or collective illusions as its consequence. It is pertinent
here to consider Miller and Stiglitz (2010) analytical model that weaves the nancial intermediation
with incentive distortions and information frictions to show how economy reacts during the time of
scal shocks and nancial instability while assessing implications of these bubbles.
None of the earlier studies have su¢ ciently addressed the issue of discrepancy between the
optimal and actual nancial ratios required for growth as done in this paper. Section 2 motivates
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the paper with a short discussion of the underlying actual nancial deepening ratios from the OECD
for ve advanced economies. Section 3 presents concepts of an e¢ cient competitive equilibrium
mechanism theory contained in non-blocking core in Shapley-Shubik game and Pareto optimal core
in a general equilibrium model that could be applied to think about e¢ cient allocations both in
goods and asset markets. It illustrates the Schumpetarian view qualitatively that growth of the
nancial sector is linked to the growth of the rest of the economy over time. Section 4 illustrates how
uctuations in growth rates are caused by shocks in the nancial sector with a simple endogenous
growth model with nancial intermediation in contrast to the Ramsey model in Bhattarai (2005)
or cash in advance or money in utility function models in Bhattarai (2014). Paper proceeds further
in constructing multisectoral and multi-household DCGE models of Germany, France, UK, Japan
and USA in section 5 to establish the e¢ cient and optimal paths of capital output ratios implied
by underlying equilibrium mechanism illustrated in Figures 4 and 5. This paper contributes to
the literature by nding the degrees of the excess nancial deepening ratios (FD-ratios) above the
optimal ones required for smooth process of economic growth implied by the DCGE models of these
economies. Conclusions, references and appendices supporting the study are in the nal section.
2 Actual Financial Deepening Ratios: Statistical Facts
In general the size of the nancial assets a country has is closely linked to its size of GDP as shown
in Figures 1 and 2 for ve advanced countries. Contrast GDP of 15.5 trillion to nancial assets
of 156.5 trillion dollars for the US economy with GDP of 1.5 trillion and FA of 29 trillion pounds
for the UK. Data for the nancial assets were obtained from the OECDs non-consolidated balance
sheets in which the nancial assets include currency and deposits, nancial derivatives, securities,
shares and equities for years 2007-2011. GDP gures were obtained from the OECD as well.
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Figure 1: GDP of Five Advanced Countries ( $trillion )
Figure 2: Financial Assets of Five Advanced Countries ($trillion )
The actual nancial deepening ratio (FA/GDP) is calculated by dividing the nancial assets by
GDP as shown in Figure 3. UK had the highest FD-ratios followed by Japan, France, USA and
Germany. Thus UK nancial system has more excess leveraging than other countries and more
vulnerable to nancial crisis like those of 2008. In fact all economies are vulnerable to good or
bad nancial sector policies, degree of over-nancing and wide ranging ine¢ ciencies, uctuations
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in growth of output and other economic activities whenever the actual nancial deepening ratios
deviate signicantly from optimal ones.
Financial assets are counter parts of physical capital in a well balanced economy. Thus in the
classical system with saving investment identity the rate of capital accumulation not only reects
rate of economic growth but also the accumulation of nancial wealth in the economy. A higher
degree of nancial deepening through saving and investment activities promotes the level of income
and raises the rates of economic growth. In real world level of economic advancement seems to
have gone together with the level of nancial deepening until the deregulation of nancial markets
in mid 1980s. However this tacit link seems to have broken in recent years.
Figure 3: Actual Financial Deepening Ratio in Five Advanced Countries
From the OECD data summarised more precisely in Table 1 it is clear that the nancial deep-
ening ratios are twice as large in the UK than those in Germany. While Japan is close to the UK
but France and USA are closer to Germany in these ratios. Thus data makes it clear that UK and
Japan are more vulnerable to nancial sector turbulences than France, USA and Germany. It is
important to show that nancial and real sectors of the economy are mirror images of each other.
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Table 1: Financial Deepening in Five Advanced Economies
Fra n c e G e rm a ny U n i t e d K in g d om J a p a n U SA
FA G D P FD ra t io FA G D P FD ra t io FA G D P FD ra t io FA G D P FD ra t io FA G D P FD ra t io
2 0 0 7 2 0 .5 2 1 .8 9 1 0 .8 8 1 9 .3 4 2 .4 3 7 .9 6 2 1 .2 7 1 .4 1 1 5 .0 6 5 1 .4 8 4 .2 7 1 2 .0 6 1 4 0 .0 7 1 4 .4 8 9 .6 7
2 0 0 8 1 9 .4 4 1 .9 3 1 0 .0 6 1 9 .5 4 2 .4 7 7 .9 0 2 8 .8 0 1 .4 4 1 9 .6 6 6 0 .8 9 4 .2 9 1 4 .1 9 1 3 2 .7 6 1 4 .7 2 9 .0 2
2 0 0 9 2 0 .3 9 1 .8 9 1 0 .8 1 1 9 .7 5 2 .3 7 8 .3 2 2 4 .9 0 1 .4 0 1 7 .7 6 6 1 .8 0 4 .0 5 1 5 .2 6 1 3 7 .2 5 1 4 .4 2 9 .5 2
2 0 1 0 2 1 .3 1 1 .9 4 1 1 .0 0 2 0 .4 0 2 .5 0 8 .1 7 2 6 .9 2 1 .4 7 1 8 .3 6 7 0 .8 4 4 .2 9 1 6 .5 1 1 4 6 .7 9 1 4 .9 6 9 .8 2
2 0 1 1 2 1 .9 7 2 .0 0 1 0 .9 8 2 0 .8 0 2 .5 9 8 .0 2 2 9 .0 1 1 .5 2 1 9 .1 4 7 5 .5 0 4 .3 2 1 7 .4 8 1 5 6 .4 7 1 5 .5 3 1 0 .0 8
D a t a S o u r c e : O E C D (n a t io n a l a c c o u n t s s e c t io n ) . FA = N o n - c o n s o l id a t e d F in a n c ia l A s s e t s a n d Y = G D P b o th in Tr i l l i o n s ; F D ra t io = FA /G D P
FA a n d G D P a r e in t r i l l i o n s o f n a t io n a l c u r r e n c i e s ( J a p a n s in U S $ ) .
Consider an asset (At) accumulation equation as:
At (1 + brt) +Wt   Ct = At+1 (1)
where Ct is consumption, At nancial assets, Wt endowment, and brt+1 return to asset net of
tax and depreciation rate; brt = (1  k) (r   ) with r real interest rate,  rate of depreciation
and k capital income tax. When k = 0 equation (1) can be written as Atrt + Wt   Ct  
fAt+1   (1  )Atg = 0. Now replacing At by capital stock (Kt) and using denition of income
Yt = Atrt+Wt = Ct+ It, one gets the macro balance proving the equivalence between the nancial
assets and physical capital stocks in (2) as:
Yt   Ct   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt) = 0; =) Yt = Ct + It (2)
Thus the stocks of nancial assets (At) must balance to the stocks of physical capital (Kt) in a
smooth functioning economy with unrestricted borrowings and lending though their values remain
sensitive to shocks in various market conditions as to be discussed in sections 4 and 5.
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2.1 Optimal and Actual Financial Deepening Ratios
Optimal nancial deepening ratio (OFDRt) is the result of the growth process in the economy
and varies across production sectors (Fi;t) according to variations in investment rates and levels
of output among them. This happens as banks channel funds saved by households or enterprises
for investment by rms at the real interest rate that matches cost and productivity of funds to the
rms. Value of OFDRt is obtained by dividing the capital stocks by the GDP. Actual nancial
deepening (AFDRt) is obtained dividing the total of nancial assets from the non-consolidated
balancesheet by the GDP.
OFDRt =
Kt
Yt
=
NX
i=1
Ki;t
Yi;t
; AFDRt =
FAt
Yt
(3)
OFDRt is the real measure of optimal nancial deepening, resulting from the optimisation behavior
of consumers and rms in the economy. It should equal to the ratio of nancial assets to GDP in
the nancial market in an ideal world as shown in (4) as such intertemporal equilibria is guaranteed
by the exibility of prices, wages and interest rates in the economy. Imbalances either due to the
rigid or inexible prices cause market imperfections or crises in the real world giving a di¤erent
value to the actual nancial deepening ratio (AFDRt). Gap between OFDRt and AFDRt is due
to conditions in the nancial markets. Good nancial policies result in right set of accumulation
process and higher growth rate of the economy over periods. Then these two measures are expected
to be closer as I found in case of emerging economies illustrated in a related paper that I prepared for
the Review of Development Economics. Wrong nancial sector policies lead to mismatch between
the volume borrowed and lent, that often manifests in terms of bail outs or subsidies or preferential
treatment of one sector against another, which distorts the accumulation process ultimately reducing
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the prospects of the economy in the long run. This causes a large gap between OFDRt and AFDRt
as to be presented in section 5.
What is the optimal ratio for a bubble-less smooth functioning of these economies? For each
period t, OFDRt is aggregated from from the sectoral optimal ratios, OFDRi;t =
Ki;t
Yi;t
obtained
from the solution of the DCGE model with many production sectors. This is discussed in section 5
after explaining the meaning of the core allocations and stochastic growth underlying those DCGE
calculations in sections 3 and 4.
3 Classical Theory: Core of Finance, Growth and E¢ ciency
The dynamic economy implied by models mentioned in section 1 is better explained by diagrams in
Figure 4 and 5. Figures 4 shows distinct possibilities of excess or shallow nancing in comparison
to the normal equilibrium path in the middle. Then the uctuations around the steady state are
shown in Figure 5 where the E-E is allocations representing the core equilibrium path; LL market
valuations of lenders; BB the market valuation of borrowers. The gap between LL and BB reects
the subjective di¤erences in the assessment of prospects of nancial assets. The gap between these
two is the reason for trades among lenders and borrowers. Wide uctuations in these are not only
the sources of cycles but also the sources of crises.
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F ig u r e 4 : F in a n c ia l D e e p e n in g a n d E c o n om ic G row th F ig u r e 5 : E q u i l ib r iu m a n d C o r e in A s s e t M a rk e t s O v e r T im e
Market equilibrium path E-E represents a no friction complete information world of lenders and
borrowers. It ignores the asymmetry of information in nancial markets, which is the underlying
cause of deviation of asset accumulation path of borrowers (BB) and lenders (LL) of the equilibrium
path (EE). The main intuitive points from classical theory of nance and growth thus are as follows:
1. Assets are results of consumption saving behavior resulting from the intertemporal optimisa-
tion of households or rms.
2. There is an equilibrium allocation EE for each time period of the economy that is at the core
of the equilibrium.
3. Lenders and borrowers start with di¤erent amounts of endowments and bargain continuously
in order to gain more from the transaction.
4. Underlying productivity and preferences cause di¤erentiation in valuation by the buyers and
sellers in the asset markets. Therefore the valuation can be generalised in n number of cases.
5. Corrective measures are taken by individuals or the policy makers when these valuations
signicantly deviate away from the underlying equilibrium destabilising the whole nancial
system.
6. The asset accumulation prole can contain overlapping generations and has innite life in
contrast to individual traders with nite life.
7. There are gains from trading in the nancial markets. Whether the lenders or the borrowers
get the larger shares of this gain depend on their bargaining power, which changes over time.
Miller-Stiglitz mechanism of bubbles and crashes is helpful in advancing above thoughts by
designing incentive compatible contracts contained in Maskin and Tirole (1990) and Roth (2008) to
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separate normal borrower and lenders from risky ones under asymmetric information to solve moral
hazard or adverse selection problems required to ensure e¢ cient equilibrium path EE by minimising
gaps in their evaluation as shown above by LL and BB lines in Figure 5. Arbitrage in the nancial
market should be set in such a way that it guarantees the e¢ cient and Pareto optimal core of the
economy in coalition games and growth with dynamic general equilibrium in the economy.
3.1 Arbitrage and core in games and general equilibrium models
Arbitrage conditions set at the core of the economy lead to e¢ cient decisions in the nancial markets
and promote growth. Game theory and general equilibrium models show how optimal choices are
made by consumers and producers facing the resource constraint are e¢ cient when these set of
points belong to the core of an economy. Arriving to these unique set points in the core involves
continuos bargaining over the gains from the intra and intertemporal trade on goods, services and
nancial assets. Technically the Shapley value of a bargaining game is given by the payo¤ from
non-blocking coalition in a Shapley-Shubic game and it is a set of Pareto e¢ cient points. Similarly
core of a general equilibrium lies in the contract curve where it is di¢ cult to make one economic
agent better o¤ without making another worse o¤. The core of the coalition in the game and that
in a general equilibrium model represent basically the same e¢ cient points and relative prices as
proven in (4). These are consistent to the e¢ cient arbitrage conditions in an e¢ cient nancial
market. As the optimal allocation of resources to economic agents possible with given endowments
conrm to the rst and second theorems of welfare economics, solutions either of game or DCGE
models characterise the optimal allocation of resources after more complex bid and o¤er interactions
among economic agents. This also happens to be the key process in the nancial markets. This set
of e¢ cient points is illustrated by the intersections of three circles at the centre in a Venn diagram
13
with three players as in Figure 61 .
Figure 6: Shapley Shubik Core in a Venn Diagram
Economic agents in the nancial markets tend to play a zero sum and non-cooperative game
when they are outside this core set. The benets of coalition and cooperation far exceed from non-
cooperation (Gale (1986)). Even when agreements are made for cooperation there are questions on
whether such coalitions are stable. There are always temptations at least for some players to cheat
and break the cooperative agreements in anticipation of raising their own share from the total gains
against other players. However, such process sets a motion of negative externality and retaliations
resulting in mistrusts and eventually a low value of the game. No player can fool other players
for long as they will discover the cheaters and penalise them more than what they could gain by
1Debreu and Scarf (1963) had proven the equivalence of a competitive equilibrium to the core of the game for
economies with and without production by contradiction when preferences are non-satiable, strictly convex and
continuous. Scarf (1967) theorem states that a balanced n person game has a non-empty core. Financial markets
open each time, bid-o¤er process sets the prices of assets, exchange takes place in the core. This process continues
forever. Thus the competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the allocation at the core, An exchange economy with
convex preferences always gives rise to a balanced n person game and such will always have a non-empty core (Scarf
(1967)).
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cheating, thus giving the non-cooperative Nash outcome of the game.
A nancial coalition among players should be consistent to the individual rationality, group
rationality and coalition rationality because of the supper-additivity property. This implies that
the value of the game in a coalition is greater than the sum of the value of the game of playing alone
non-cooperatively by those individual members. In case of three players this means: v (1 [ 2 [ 3) 
v1 (1)+v (2)+v (3) ; nancial coalitions (parties) playing together generate more value, v (1 [ 2 [ 3)
for each of its member than when they play alone with payo¤s v1 (1) ; v (2) ;and v (3). Cooperation
and team spirit generates extra benets. Considering three sets, 1,2, and 3, of possible allocations
in a market, there is only a tiny set core equilibrium as illustrated by the intersection of 1,2, and
3 in the Venn diagram in Figure 6. Financial arbitrage made at this core are e¢ cient and optimal
and bring smooth growth in the economy. Thus e¢ cient allocations in the economy are only a small
subset of all possible allocations. Proliferations of nancial assets as observed in the OECD data
in section is the union of sets rather than their interactions at the core.
On the otherhand a general equilibrium is given by the relative prices that clears all markets in
the economy. It is derived using a sequence of correspondence and optimising relations by which
consumers and producers make prudent choices subject of resource or technology constraints and
public policies. Consumers optimal choice set are complete, transitive, continuos, monotonous
and convex; fu : Rn  ! Rjx 2 Xg. These contain quantities of n commodities (x = x1;x2;:::::xn)
in nonnegative orthant of X 2 Rn: These maximize utility u(x) subject to budget constraints
p:x  y. Given the input and output prices, w  0 and p  0 producers choose output levels
y 2 Rn+ to maximize their prots,  (p; w) = p:y w:x; ; fy : Rm  ! Rjy 2 Y g : Here y is produced
using labour and capital. The general equilibrium system results in the Pareto optimal allocation
when it is not possible to improve the level of welfare of one person without lowering the level of
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welfare of another person. Financial allocations emerging from this core given by the relative prices
that guarantee equilibrium in the system lead to the most e¢ cient outcome in terms of welfare and
growth though these are often distorted by the tax, transfer, spending policies of government as
well as tari¤s and trade system in the global economy. The wide-ranging backward and forward
linkage e¤ects of the nancial markets run on arbitrage principles are consistent to the feasibility
and optimality of intertemporal plans of consumers and producers at the core. This optimal
core itself is however subject to shocks of nancial frictions and technologies of production from
time to time and can cause signicant uctuations in economic growth. How it happens is briey
illustrated in the next section in an one sector growth model with nancial intermediation to provide
a background for the DCGE model in section 5.
4 Model of Financial Intermediation and Endogenous Growth
Let a dynamic economy be expressed with a simple stochastic technology Yt = ztKt where
zt  N
 
0; 2

. Capital stock accumulates form investment, It = Kt+1   (1  )Kt. Amount
of investment deviates from saving depending on the e¢ ciency of nancial markets (0 <  < 1),
It = St and IY =
S
Y as in (Bhattarai,2005). Assuming market clearing Yt = Ct + St and a steady
growth rate of the economy Kt+1 = (1 + g)Kt and the parameters z; ; s and  in Table 2 deter-
mine the growth rate of the economy as shown in (5)2 and in Figure 3. Kiyotaki and Moore (2006)
illustrate importance of the bilateral and multilateral commitment in maintaining the e¢ ciency of
the nancial system () like this3 .
2* It = St = (1 + g)Kt   (1  )Kt = (g + )K = (g + ) Yz
3Bhattarai (2014) numerically shows how nancial crises of 2008 could be explained due to the shocks to these
real sides of the nancial system is illustrated with standard dynamics contained in simple cash in advance (CIA) in
Sargent (1987), and money in utility (MIU) theories Sidrauski (1967) in small prototype models.
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g = z
I
Y
   = zs   (5)
Table 2: Endogenous growth with nancial e¢ ciency
Parameters   y0 z s
CIA 0:02 0:95 1 (0:15; 0:05) 0:15
Figure 7: Fluctuations in growth rates due to stochastic nancial frictions
Such excess volatility in economic growth causes further bubbles or crash in contagious fashion
as shown by Miller and Stiglitz (2010) resulting in panic runs to the banks or exuberances as
shown in Figures 4 and 5 above with a wide gaps between OFDRt and AFDRt. Policy analyses
and prescriptions that not based on the structural features of the economy and heterogeniety in
consumption, production and trade can hardly come up with a concrete solutions required to resolve
the problem. Despite a large body of theoretical and empirical literature on nance and growth
mentioned in section 1 very little work has taken place in analysing the nancial markets with
a dynamic general equilibrium model. This lacuna in the literature motives us for this e¤ort on
constructing a dynamic CGE model to explain the implications of nancial deepening on e¢ ciency,
growth and redistribution rening Bhattarai (1997). The main ingredients of these DCGE models
are presented in the next section.
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5 Finance in a Dynamic CGE Model
A dynamic CGE model quanties how the size of nancial sector relates and contributes to the
economic growth at the core over time. There are mainly two di¤erent theories relevant to a DCGE.
One is the classical approach which takes nance as a by product of investment saving activities
among economic agents. The size of the nancial sector basically is determined by the rate of saving
and investment, marginal productivity of capital and size of the economy in it. This structure
resembles to a competitive market economy with the neoclassical or Ramsey process of economic
growth. In more recent theories, the sizes of nancial sector and the economy are endogenously
linked to each other and determined by the risk taking behavior or risk pooling arrangements of
economic agents. Risky projects usually have higher rate of return but investors are willing to take
risky projects only when risk is pooled among borrowers and lenders by an insurance mechanism.
An economy with greater degree of risk-pulling will have higher rate of investment and growth and
larger nancial sector because of implementation of more productive investment plans in general.
Higher level of income in turn allows more amounts to be saved and invested. Greater the degree of
capital accumulation bigger are the coalitions of intermediaries and larger the size of the nancial
sector (Townsend (1983), Greenwood and Javanovic (1990) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997),
Balasko (2003), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)). This theory is supportive of the deregulation
and liberalisation of nancial sector after 1980s. It is however irony that the risk taking behavior
can reach out of proportions and create bubbles and lead to collapse of the nancial system as it
happened unprecedented in nancial crisis of 2008 (and in several episodes of them that preceded
it). Such devastating experience has made economists think about structural theories of bubbles
originating in the nancial sector that spreads adverse consequences not only on asset prices but
also investment, growth, employment and welfare of the households in the economy.
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The DCGE model proposed here takes main points of above theories and properly accounts
for the intertemporal preferences of households between the current and future consumption (and
saving), long run decision of investors in accumulating capital and the policies of government that
often positive or negative a¤ects on choices of these heterogenous rms and households. It is perti-
nent to present the generic structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model here and to apply it to
the ve advanced economies selected for this study with a focus on the optimal nancial deepening
ratios emerging from the optimising behavior of consumers and producers in these economies.
5.1 Consumers
Consumers are forward looking in the DCGE model. They are interested in smoothing out their life
time consumption in order to guarantee a certain level of utility or standard of life for each period
in their life, given subjective discount factors 0 < h < 1. This requires intertemporal optimisation
over the life time, maximising lifetime utility
 
Uh0

given the present value of the life-time income
(8) and budget constraints (9).
Uh0 =
1X
t=1
hUht (6)
Uht = U
 
Chi;t; L
h
t ;c

(7)
Each consumer starting from initial endowment of physical capital
 
Kh0

and labour time
 
Lh0

makes decision to consume
 
Chi

and work

LSht = L
h
t   Lht

and save from its full income
 
Iht

in
each period leaving it to the banking system to channel those savings to the potential investors.
19
Ih0 =
" 1X
t=0
e t
NX
i=1

Pi;t (1 + ti)C
h
i;t
	
+ wht (1  tl)Lht
#
(8)
=
1X
t=0
e tIht =
" 1X
t=0
wht (1  tl)L
h
t + rt (1  tk)Kht
#
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
Pi;t
 
1 + thci

Chi;t =
TX
t=0

rt (1  tk)Kht +Rht + wht (1  tl)LSht

(9)
Households supply factors of production, Kht and LS
h
t , to rms. They receive net of tax wage
income in return to labour supply [ wht (1  tl)L
h
t ] and capital income [rt (1  tk)Kht ] in return to
their investment. They pay taxes on their capital and labour incomes and may receive transfer
payments (Rht ) from the government on the mean tested basis.
5.2 Firms
Firms are central to the supply of goods and services. Given the production technology, optimal
choices of inputs are made to maximise prots in each period and over the model horizon. Entry
and exit is allowed with regulations to maintain a competitive economy. Therefore in each period,
rms compare prices of inputs and products
 
ri;t; w
h
t ; pi;t

and determine the optimum level of
output that would maximise prots. Implicitly the level of output depends on relative prices of
inputs and outputs as:
Yi;t = Fi

Ki;t
 
ri;t; w
h
t ; pi;t

p; Li
 
wht ; pi;t

; Ai; c

(10)
TX
t=0
Pi;tYi;t =
TX
t=0
"
rt (1 + tk)Ki;t +
HX
h=i
wht (1 + tl)L
h
i;t
#
(11)
The structure of inputs and types of technology di¤ers for rms operating in di¤erent sectors -
agriculture, manufacturing, services. Some are capital intensive, others labour intensive, operating
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on linear, Cobb-Douglas or CES technologies. All of them are interested to maximise total prot
given the process of capital accumulation, Ki;t = (1  i;t)Ki;t 1 + Ii;t.
5.3 Trade
Economies modelled here are price takers in the global market except that they need to balance
their trade over time. Adjustment in the real exchange rates brings such balance in the value of
imports [
TP
t=0
NP
i=1
PMi;tMi;t] and exports [
TP
t=0
NP
i=1
PEi;tEi;t] and net ows of capital [ FLt].
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
PEi;tEi;t =
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
PMi;tMi;t (12)
NX
i=1
PEi;tEi;t  
NX
i=1
PMi;tMi;t =  FLt (13)
Real exchange rate the ratio of weighted price indices of imports and exports and thus are
determined by PEi;t and PMi;t.
5.4 Government
Government provides public services like law and order, education and health, social security and
pension and protection of environment to households and rms and adds to the public capital by
investing in economic infrastructure, health and education. These expenditures enhance productiv-
ity and make these economies more competitive in the global market. In a dynamic economy the
public spending should balance to the public revenue as shown in (14).
1X
t=0
e tRVt 7
1X
t=0
e t
 
Gt +R
h
t

(14)
Government collects revenue through direct taxes on income of households and rms and indirect
21
taxes on their consumption. The optimal level of public expenditure and revenues is set when the
benets from the public spending equals the costs of public funds in equilibrium (see Mirrlees et
al. (2010)).
5.5 Markets
This dynamic economy is run e¢ ciently by the market clearing relative price system. There a
tatonement process in operation to eliminate the excess demand for each commodity in the model.
Prices of commodities and services and factors of production continue to adjust until demands
are balanced to supplies in each market. The optimal nancial deepening ratio (OFDRt = KtYt )
measures the ratio of capital to output in aggregate. Corresponding measures across sectors are
given by optimality conditions guiding the accumulation for these sectors, OFDRi;t =
Ki;t
Yi;t
. The
real exchange rate links between the domestic and foreign sectors were results of the ow of imports
and exports. Equilibrium allocations and arbitrage occur at the core of the economy and are Pareto
optimal. In other words DCGE economy converges towards the competitive equilibrium over time
and in each period and are optimal in the sense that all economic agents are doing the best given
the amount of assets and time endowments they possess.
6 Parameters and Results of DCGE Model on Financial
Deepening
The DCGE model constructed to assess the prospects of nancial development in ve economies
consisted of eleven sectors of goods and services, capital assets di¤erentiated by sectors and labour
di¤erentiated by skills. The micro-consistent datasets for these models were taken from the input
output tables published by the OECD in 2006 for Germany, France, UK, Japan and USA. These
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datasets provide information on the actual values for demand supply balances of rms, revenue
and expenditure of the government, saving and investment balance for the private sector and the
export-import balance for the economy. For instance the variation in the capital input tax rates
(tk) by sectors across model economies are as presented in Table 3. Other details on data and
programme are skipped for space reasons and kept in the Appendix available upon request.
Table 3: Taxes in capital input by sectors across countries for the CGE Models
Germany France UK Japan USA
Primary -0.0724 0.0144 0.0103 0.0218 0.0054
Manufacturing 0.0241 0.0562 0.0627 0.1621 0.0242
Metal Manufacturing 0.0319 0.1012 0.0881 0.0557 0.0156
Machine Manufacturing 0.0457 0.1542 0.0851 0.0426 0.0119
Utilities 0.0378 0.0683 0.0683 0.0382 0.0732
Construction 0.0220 0.0876 0.0684 0.1093 0.0096
Tourism, Hotel and Restaurant 0.0580 0.0717 0.0543 0.0514 0.2200
Transport and communication 0.0264 0.0821 0.0921 0.0394 0.0500
Financial and Real Estate 0.0184 0.0313 0.0196 0.0135 0.0411
Business Services 0.0042 0.0495 0.0395 0.0356 0.0048
Professional Services 0.0213 0.0679 0.0647 0.0239 0.0351
Key parameters of dynamic model such as the elasticity of substitution between consumption
and leisure
 
hc

, intertemporal subjective discount factor

h

; substitution between capital and
labour in production ( y), elasticity of substituiton between domestic goods and imports ( m)
are based on literature and sensitivity analysis (Robinson 1991). Acceptable values are assigned for
the benchmark rate of growth, benchmark interest rate and generic rate of depreciation are given
in Table 4.
Table 4: Key parameters for model simulations
Parameters hc gi;t r 
h i;t y k m
Values 1.5 0.02 0.05 0.98 0.1 2.0 1.5 1.0
A number of assumptions are made regarding the nature of the steady states among these
economies. First, the bench mark rate of return on capital stock is chosen to be the natural rate of
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interest (r) for each country. Information about the rate of deprecation of capital (i) in each sector
is obtained from the historical data and tested with sensitivity analyses. The steady state growth
rates (gi) are made consistent with the historical growth rates for each sector. The parametric values
of r; i and gi dene the reference path of the economy. Elasticities of substitution in consumption
(c) and production (p) are based on the literature. In addition to capital input taxes as above,
model contains taxes on consumption, wage income and transfers to households

tc; tw; R
h
t
	
that
are retained for all sectors except for the nancial and real estate sectors in the counter factual
analyses. Model is applied for policy analysis only after the calibration of the benchmark economies
with the microconsisent dataset constructed for the 11 sector general equilibrium model from the
input-output table obtained from the OECD. Fundamentals to all these rest on the optimising
behavior of households regarding the division of labour between leisure
 
Lht

and work and division
of income between consumption
 
Cht

and saving
 
Sht

. Accumulation capital drives the rate of
economic growth.
6.1 Optimal and actual nancial deepening
The general equilibrium theory provides a very clear framework for analysis of results obtained
by solving equations with more than 14 thousands variables simultaneously for each of ve model
economies; France, Germany, UK, Japan and USA with a lifetime horizon of 86 years between 2006
and 1992. The optimal nancial deepening ratios (OFDR) in the steady state are based on DCGE
results (OFDRt = KtYt ), the ratios of actual nancial deepening ratios are ratios of stock of assets
from the OECD balance sheet to the GDP (AFDRt = FAtYt ) as expressed in (3) earlier. The results
are relevant to the basic theme of this paper are summarised in Table 54 .
4Detailed solutions of these models are skipped here for space reasons and can be available upon request.
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Table 5: Optimal, actual and excess nancial deepening ratios (FDR) in Frnace, Germany, the UK,
Janpan and the USA
Parameters Optimal FDR Actual FDR Excess FDR
France 3.16 10.98 7.82
Germany 3.31 8.02 4.71
UK 3.24 19.12 15.88
Japan 1.51 17.48 15.97
USA 3.19 15.53 12.34
The overall optimal real nancial deepening ratios from the general equilibrium models are
consistent across countries; these are found to be around 3.16 in France, 3.31 in Germany, 3.24 for the
UK, 1.51 in Japan and 3.19 in the USA. These are sensible results and consistent to the converging
patterns of economic growth across these countries. The actual ratios of nancial deepening reported
in the OECD non-consolidated balance sheets of 10.98, 8.02, 19.1, 17.48 and 15.53 exceed by factor
of 3.5, 2.4, 5.1, 11.6 and 4.8 than the optimal ratios computed from the solutions of the DCGE
models of France, Germany, the UK, Japan and USA respectively as shown in Table 5. These are
easier to compare and appraise in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: Actual and optimal nancial deepening in advanced countries
The discrepancy between the real and the nominal magnitudes of nancial deepening gives
credibility to the over-nancing hypothesis that UK economy is more vulnerable to the nancial
crises as it has more assets originating from the nancial derivatives and is more subject to the
problems caused by asymmetric information. Japan is in a similar situation. Sectoral impacts of
nancial sector reforms are di¤erent for each of three countries. Despite this, economic growth rates
in these models are driven by fundamentals of the nancial markets based on the net present value
calculations and portfolio selections satisfying the arbitrage across markets, risk-return analysis to
minimise risks and maximise returns in anticipation of insurances to cover unforeseen contingencies.
Supply of funds arises from inter-temporal utility maximising consumers and demand for funds for
investment originates from prot maximising producers. Subjective discount factors of consumers
and depreciation rates of capital of rms are balanced by the real interest rates so that funds are
allocated according to the marginal utilities of households or productivities across various sectors
leaving regulatory roles to the government for maintaining law and order to create fair opportunities
for the participants from the private sector.
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6.2 Policy implications
On-going nancial sector reforms, including the mortgage to income ratios announced recently for
the housing markets at 4.5 or tax free ISA in the UK, can be expected to make these economies
more e¢ cient so that the costs of funds decline in the counter factual experiments, where the taxes
on the nancial sectors are set to minimise distortions relative to the benchmark. Such measures
will then result in the higher rate of growth of output, employment and capital stock in almost all
sectors even with lower capital output ratios. By designing measures to counter ine¢ ciencies due to
the asymmetric information problem the nancial liberalisation pays for itself, welfare of consumers
improves with reforms rather than without it.
The proper reforms of nancial markets not only improves the e¢ ciency of nancial intermedi-
ation but also brings speedier rate of economic growth by linking the lending and borrowing rates
to the fundamentals of demand and supply of funds, removing controls on credits, by creating
right structure of incentives for investors and depositors and by freeing up the foreign exchange
market from arbitrary decisions making it subject to fundamentals of domestic and foreign asset
markets. These mechanism remove repressionary regimes with non inationary public nance for
smooth processrd of capital accumulation, increased liquidity, technical advancement and economic
growth, elimination of parallel markets and reducing the proportion of toxic non-performing as-
sets. Liberalisation and reform mechanisms thus are instrumental in reversing repressionary and
distortionaly nancial regimes towards more classical free enterprise economy that would promote
accumulation and growth in these model economies.
Monetary policy was not e¤ective in containing the current crisis because of excess nancial
deepening ratio due to the excess leveraging and collateral debt obligations in the nancial markets
made possible by nancial liberalisation and deregulations that led to proliferation of toxic assets
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in these economies. Further analysis of these are found in seminal and most recent papers such as
Fama (2014), Shiller (2014), Hansen (2012), Taylor (2010), Brunnermeier and and Sannikov (2014)
and Nordhaus (1995). Bhattarai (2014) proves the neutrality of money both in cash in advance
and money in utility models. This provides validity to the analysis of the real nancial sector as
presented in this paper.
Competitive nancial markets are perfect in allocating assets only when all agents that have
complete information and are e¢ cient in processing such information. Financial markets are full
of asymmetric information, activities of one set of players depend on actions taken by another set
of players and the amount of information they have impacts on the likely choices of others. This
requires state contingent incentive compatible mechanisms in the DCGE model and is an issue for
further investigation.
7 Conclusion
The core of Shapley-Shubik games and general equilibrium models with a Venn diagram is applied
for a theory on the role of real nance in economic growth among advanced economies. Then the
dynamic computable general equilibrium (DCGE) models for Germany, France, UK, Japan and
USA are constructed to assess the validity of the over nancing hypothesis that reappeared after
the nancial crisis of 2008. Actual nancial deepening ratios observed in the non-consolidated
balancesheet of the OECD exceeded by factors of 3.5, 2.4, 5.1, 11.6 and 4.8 to the optimal nancial
deepening ratios implied by DCGE models respectively in these countries because of excessive
leveraging and bubbles up to 19 times of GDP which were responsible for this great recession.
Containing such massive uctuations for macroeconomic stability and growth in these economies is
not possible in conventional scal and monetary policy models and requires a DCGE analysis like
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this along with adoption of separating equilibria strategy in line of Miller-Stiglitz-Roth mechanisms
to avoid asymmetric information problems in process of nancial intermediation so that the gap
between actual and optimal ratios of nancial deepening remain as small as possible.
The dynamic CGE model results used in measuring the gap between the actual and optimal
nancial deepening ratios is a unique contribution of this paper to the literature on nancial deep-
ening and economic growth. It takes account of wide-ranging interactions among a large number
consumers and producers and mimics the real world situations in model economies5 .
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